the-bot-takes-a-bow

The Bot Takes a Bow

Late law month I wrote about a sample NextGen question that GPT-4 discovered was based on an outdated, minority rule of law. NCBE has now removed the question from their website, although it is still accessible (for those who are curious) through the Wayback Machine. While the Bot takes a small bow for assisting NCBE on this question, I’ll offer some reflections.

We hear a lot about mistakes that GPT-4 makes, but this is an example of GPT-4 correcting a human mistake. Law is a vast, complex field, especially considering state-to-state variations in the United States. Both humans and AI will make mistakes when identifying and interpreting legal rules within this large universe. This story shows that AI can help humans correct their mistakes: We can partner with AI to increase our knowledge and better serve clients.

At the same time, the partnership requires us to acknowledge that AI is also fallible. That’s easier said than done because we rely every day on technologies that are much more accurate than humans. If I want to know the time, my phone will give a much more accurate answer than my internal clock. The odometer in my car offers a more accurate measure of the car’s speed than my subjective sense. We regularly outsource many types of questions to highly reliable technologies.

AI is not the same as the clocks on our phones. It knows much more than any individual human, but it still makes mistakes. In that sense, AI is more “human” than digital clocks, odometers, or other technologies. Partnering with AI is a bit like working with another human: we have to learn this partner’s strengths and weaknesses, then structure our working relationship around those characteristics. We may also have to think about our own strengths and weaknesses to get the most out of the working relationship.

GPT-4’s review of the NextGen question suggests that it may be a useful partner in pretesting questions for exams. Professors read over their exam questions before administering them, looking for ambiguities and errors. But we rarely have the opportunity to pretest questions on other humans–apart from the occasional colleague or family member. Feeding questions to GPT-4 could allow us to doublecheck our work. For open-ended questions that require a constructed response, GPT-4 could help us identify issues raised by the question that we might not have intended to include. Wouldn’t it be nice to know about those before we started grading student answers?

I hope that NCBE and other test-makers will also use AI as an additional check on their questions. NCBE subjects questions to several rounds of scrutiny–and it pretests multiple-choice questions as unscored questions on the MBE–but AI can offer an additional check. Security concerns might be addressed by using proprietary AI.

Moving beyond the testing world, GPT-4 can offer a doublecheck for lawyers advising clients. In some earlier posts, I suggested that new lawyers could ask GPT-4 for pointers as they begin working on a client problem. But GPT-4 can assist later in the process as well. Once a lawyer has formulated a plan for addressing a problem, why not ask GPT-4 if it sees any issues with the plan or additional angles to consider? (Be sure, of course, to redact client identifying information when using a publicly accessible tool like GPT-4.)

Our partnership with GPT-4 and other types of AI is just beginning. We have much to learn–and many potential benefits to reap.

fundamental-legal-concepts-and-principles

Fundamental Legal Concepts and Principles

I talk to a lot of lawyers about licensing, and many suggest that the licensing process should ensure that new lawyers know basic concepts that are essential for competent law practice in any field. Detailed rules, they agree, vary by practice area and jurisdiction; it would be unfair (and impractical) to license lawyers based on their knowledge of those detailed rules. Instead, knowledge of basic concepts should support learning and practice in any area of the law.

NCBE seems to embrace that approach. As I discussed in my last post, NCBE is designing its NextGen bar exam to test “foundational legal skills” and “clearly identified fundamental legal concepts and principles needed in today’s practice of law.” Let’s leave skills aside for now and focus on those fundamental legal concepts and principles. Are there such concepts? Do lawyers agree on what they are? How does a licensing body like NCBE identify those concepts?

The Search for Fundamental Legal Concepts

NCBE began its quest for appropriate exam content by holding extensive listening sessions with bar exam stakeholders. The report summarizing these listening sessions pointed to three key points related to the knowledge tested by the exam: (1) Stakeholders generally agreed that the seven subjects currently tested on the MBE include the “core content” that newly licensed lawyers need to know. (2) Within that content, the current exam tests too many “nuanced issues and ‘exceptions to exceptions to rules.’” (3) Overall, the current bar exam tests too many subjects, since both NCBE and some states add content to the exam through their essays.

NCBE then conducted a nationwide practice analysis to “provide empirical data on the job activities of newly licensed lawyers.” This survey, which followed standard practice for identifying the content of licensing exams, asked respondents to rate 77 different knowledge areas. For each area, respondents were asked to give one of four ratings:

  • 0 — this area of knowledge is not applicable/necessary for a newly licensed lawyer
  • 1 — this area of knowledge is minimally important for a newly licensed lawyer
  • 2 — this area of knowledge is important but not essential for a newly licensed lawyer
  • 3 — this area of knowledge is essential for a newly licensed lawyer

This rating system followed standard practice, but it was not tightly focused on “fundamental legal concepts.” Each of the 77 knowledge areas on the survey might have contained at least one fundamental concept. In entry-level law practice, it may be more important for a lawyer to know a little about each of these areas (so that they can identify issues in client problems and seek further information) than to know a lot about a few of them.

Here’s an example: Admiralty law ranked dead last among the 77 knowledge areas included in NCBE’s practice analysis. But shouldn’t entry-level lawyers know that admiralty is a distinct field, governed by rules of its own and litigated exclusively in federal court? And that admiralty law governs even recreational boating on navigable waters within the United States? Otherwise, a new lawyer might waste time analyzing a water skiing injury under general negligence principles–and file a lawsuit in the wrong court.

The same is true of other low-ranking subjects in the NCBE practice analysis. Shouldn’t new lawyers at least know when principles of workers compensation, tax law, juvenile law, and dozens of other practice areas might affect their client problems?

“Fundamental concepts,” in other words, differ from “common practice areas,” although there is some overlap between the two. The concept of negligence, for example, is one that cuts across many practice areas–and is also central to a common practice area (personal injury law). But much of the time, the two types of knowledge diverge. Which is essential for minimum competence? Concepts that cut across practice areas, rules of law in fields where new lawyers commonly practice, or both?

The top ten knowledge areas identified in NCBE’s practice analysis underscore this tension. Four of the knowledge areas (civil procedure, contract law, rules of evidence, and tort law) are subjects in which many new lawyers practice–although those subjects also contain some concepts that cut across practice areas. The six others (rules of professional responsibility and ethical obligations, legal research methodology, statutes of limitations, local court rules, statutory interpretation principles, and sources of law) reference concepts that cut across many practice areas. In fact, four of these six (professional responsibility and ethical obligations, legal research methodology, statutory interpretation principles, and sources of law) cut across all practice areas.

Two of the subjects on NCBE’s top-ten list, statutes of limitations and local court rules, are particularly interesting because they directly embody a fundamental principle. I doubt that the lawyers who responded to NCBE’s survey thought that entry-level lawyers should know specific statutes of limitations or all local court rules. Instead, they seemed to be signalling the importance of these fundamental concepts. All entry-level lawyers should know that most causes of action have statutes of limitations and that it is essential to determine those limits at the very beginning of client representation. It might also be fundamental to know common ways in which the running of a limitations statute can be tolled. Similarly, all entry-level lawyers should understand that local courts have rules, that these rules often differ from the federal and state rules, and that it is essential to consult those rules. As a clinic professor, I can attest that many third-year law students don’t even know that local court rules exist, much less the type of subjects they govern. Yet local courts handle the overwhelming bulk of lawsuits in this country.

Next Steps

How did NCBE resolve this tension between fundamental legal concepts and rules that govern common practice areas? I’ll explore that subject in my next post. And then I’ll tie this discussion back to the need for a rule book outlining the “legal concepts and principles” that NCBE plans to test on the NextGen bar exam.

lay-down-the-law

Lay Down the Law

In my last post, I discussed a sample bar exam question that requires knowledge of a rule followed by a minority of US jurisdictions. The question seems inconsistent with NCBE’s intent to test “a focused set of clearly identified fundamental legal concepts and principles needed in today’s practice of law.” A minority rule would have to be very influential to fit that description. I suspect that one of NCBE’s subject-matter experts composed this question without realizing that the tested rule was a minority one. Given the breadth of jurisdictions in the United States, and the complexity of legal principles, that’s an easy mistake to make.

That breadth and complexity prompts this recommendation: NCBE should publish a complete list of the doctrinal rules that it plans to test on the NextGen exam. The Content Scope Outlines, which describe areas of law to be tested, are not sufficient. Nor is it sufficient to refer to sources of law, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence or various Restatements. Instead, NCBE should spell out the actual rules that will be tested–and should do that now, while jurisdictions are evaluating NextGen and educators are starting to prepare their students for the exam.

NCBE’s Content Scope Committee, on which I served, recommended creation of this type of “rule book” in late 2021. I hope that NCBE has been working during the last two years to implement that recommendation. Here are some of the reasons why we need NCBE to “lay down the law” that it plans to test on NextGen:

“Fundamental Concepts” Are Shapeshifters

Lawyers often assume that there is a body of fundamental legal concepts that states agree upon, experts endorse, law schools teach, and the bar exam can test. But there is plenty of evidence that this assumption is wrong. Consider the American Law Institute‘s ongoing Restatements of the Law. The Restatements “aim at clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently stands.” In other words, they attempt to summarize the black letter law in major subjects. Yet the experts who formulate these Restatements take years–often decades–to agree on those principles. The Institute’s first Restatement of Torts took sixteen years (1923-1939) to produce. The Restatement Second of Torts took even longer, twenty-seven years stretching from 1952-1979. And the Third Restatement, which experts began discussing in the early 1990s, still isn’t complete–thirty years later.

Even the Federal Rules of Evidence, which may be the most verifiable set of legal principles tested on the bar exam, are subject to different interpretations among the circuits. The federal Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules discusses these differences and ambiguities at least twice a year. Sometimes the differences prompt amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence; other times they persist.

There are probably some legal principles that all states and federal circuits apply in a similar manner. But many more, my research suggests, vary by time and place: they are shapeshifters. Given this variation, together with the breadth of legal principles that will be tested on the NextGen exam, NCBE needs to spell out exactly the legal principles it plans to test–and to make that rule book public.

Fair to Everyone

A public rule book is important for all bar exam stakeholders. Test-takers shouldn’t have to guess whether NCBE will test a majority or minority rule–or to figure out on their own which is the majority rule. Nor should they have to purchase expensive prep courses for that information. NCBE, which designs the exam, should announce the specific rules it will test.

Jurisdictions also need that information. When deciding whether to adopt NextGen, jurisdictions should be able to assess the extent to which NextGen’s legal principles overlap with their own state law. For jurisdictions that adopt NextGen, the information will help them decide whether they need to supplement the exam with a state-specific component and, if so, what rules that component should cover.

Educators vary in how much they teach to the bar exam, but many would appreciate knowing the extent to which their material aligns with the rules NCBE will test. For Academic Support Faculty this information is critical. How can they help students prepare for the bar exam if they have to guess about which version of a rule will be tested?

Perhaps most important, a public rule book is essential to ensure that the bar exam serves its purpose of protecting the public. There is wisdom in the crowd. If NCBE’s expert advisors make a mistake–or fail to catch a change in the law–judges, practitioners, and professors who know the field can advise them of the need to change the rule book.

Can It Be Done?

Is it possible for NCBE to publish a rule book of this nature? If it takes experts several decades to prepare a Restatement of the Law, will NCBE be able to publish a rule book for NextGen within the next year or so? For two reasons, I think it can.

First, NCBE already has an implicit rule book. When subject matter experts create and vet questions, they are following rules of law. Their questions have right and wrong answers–and NCBE knows which answers it considers correct. A rule book simply requires the experts to lay out the answers before (or at the same time as) they design the questions. That’s good test-making policy: First decide what you want the test-takers to know, and then design questions to elicit that knowledge.

Second, NCBE does not have to weigh emerging trends or negotiate stark differences among states when laying down the law of the bar exam. If a rule is highly contested or quickly evolving, it probably doesn’t belong in the category of “clearly identified fundamental legal concepts and principles.” Or, if it does, it can be phrased in a way that reflects the existence of competing approaches. Publishing a bar exam rule book is easier than crafting a Restatement of the Law.

Concluding Thought

The creation of a bar exam rule book has another advantage, which I will discuss in my next few posts: It will help all stakeholders in the exam process think about what we mean when we refer to “fundamental legal concepts and principles.” Is there a clearly identified set of those principles? Can we agree upon them? And what is the best way to test knowledge of those concepts?

the-bot-updates-the-bar-exam

The Bot Updates the Bar Exam

** Update 11/15/23: NCBE has deleted the sample question I discuss here from their site. If you want to see the original question, you can find it through the Wayback Machine at this link.

In my last post, I discussed a sample bar exam question on which GPT-4 provided more helpful answers than the choices on the bar exam. As I continued my exploration, I found another question on which GPT-4 revealed that NCBE is testing an outdated minority rule of law.

The question is the eighth multiple-choice question on the NextGen site. The question posits a landlord and tenant who agree upon a commercial tenancy beginning July 1. When the tenant arrives at the premises on that date, it finds that the previous tenant has not vacated the premises–and does not intend to vacate. I prompted GPT-4 with NCBE’s question (including its answer choices) and received this response:


The answer would likely be D. The tenant had not notified the landlord before bringing the eviction action.

Here’s a breakdown of the choices:

A. By suing the previous tenant for possession, the tenant elected that remedy in lieu of a suit against the landlord.

  • This is not necessarily the most convincing argument. While it’s true that the tenant elected to pursue the remedy of eviction against the prior tenant, it doesn’t mean they waived their rights against the landlord.

B. The landlord had delivered the legal right of possession to the tenant.

  • This is a tricky choice. While it’s true that the landlord and tenant orally agreed to a commercial tenancy, the landlord might have failed to deliver actual possession if the previous tenant was still occupying the premises. However, the landlord did give the tenant the legal right to possess the property, even if actual possession wasn’t immediately available. This could be a valid argument, but it’s not as strong as choice D.

C. The tenant failed to timely vacate as required to sue for constructive eviction.

  • This choice doesn’t make sense in this context. Constructive eviction refers to a situation where a tenant is forced to leave a property due to the landlord’s actions (or failures to act), which make the premises uninhabitable. The tenant in this scenario was trying to gain possession, not vacate.

D. The tenant had not notified the landlord before bringing the eviction action.

  • This seems like the strongest answer. Before taking any legal action, it’s typically expected that the aggrieved party (in this case, the tenant) will notify the party at fault (the landlord) to give them an opportunity to rectify the situation. The tenant didn’t inform the landlord of the issue until after evicting the previous tenant, meaning the landlord wasn’t given a chance to address the issue or find a solution.

Therefore, the most likely explanation if the court finds for the landlord would be D.


This response intrigued me because, according to NCBE, the correct answer is B. I decided to explore the inconsistency between NCBE’s question writers and GPT-4, so I told GPT-4: “I want to understand more about choice B. Are there states in which it is sufficient for a landlord to deliver legal possession without actual possession?” GPT-4 responded:


Yes, there’s a distinction between legal possession and actual possession, and different jurisdictions handle this distinction differently.

  1. Legal Possession vs. Actual Possession:
    • Legal Possession: Refers to the tenant’s right to possess a property. When a lease is signed (or an oral agreement is made, as long as it’s legally enforceable), the tenant typically gains legal possession of the property. This means that even if the tenant cannot actually use or occupy the property, they still have the legal rights to it.
    • Actual Possession: Refers to the physical occupancy of a property. When a tenant moves into a property and starts using it, they have taken actual possession.
  2. Legal Possession Sufficient in Some Jurisdictions:
    • In some jurisdictions, when a landlord grants a lease to a tenant, they are only obligated to deliver legal possession, not actual possession. In these jurisdictions, if a prior tenant holds over (i.e., doesn’t vacate at the end of their lease), the new tenant’s primary remedy might be against the holdover tenant, not the landlord. The reasoning is that the landlord has done their part by granting the right to possess the property, and any dispute over actual possession is between the new tenant and anyone unlawfully occupying the property.
    • However, in many other jurisdictions, landlords have a duty to deliver both legal and actual possession. If they don’t, they can be in breach of the lease.
  3. Implication in the Given Scenario:
    • If the jurisdiction in question is one where delivering legal possession is sufficient, then choice B (“The landlord had delivered the legal right of possession to the tenant.”) could be the correct reason for the court to find in favor of the landlord. In this scenario, the landlord gave the tenant the legal right to the property, and any issue with the holdover tenant would be for the new tenant to resolve.
  4. Variations by State:
    • Landlord-tenant law can vary significantly from one state to another. So, it’s important to consult the specific laws and precedents of a given jurisdiction to understand the obligations and rights of both landlords and tenants.

If you are dealing with a specific state or jurisdiction, I can try to provide more detailed information about its stance on the delivery of possession.


I know that NCBE aims to test majority or consensus rules, rather than minority ones, on its exams, so I asked GPT-4 if it knew which rule (actual or legal possession) a majority of states follow. GPT-4 answered:


  • In the U.S., the majority rule is that landlords are obligated to deliver actual possession of the premises to the tenant at the beginning of the lease term. If the landlord fails to do so, they can be held in breach of the lease.
  • This rule is more protective of tenants, ensuring that when they sign a lease (or enter into a valid oral agreement for shorter-term tenancies) and perhaps move their belongings, business equipment, etc., they are assured of actually being able to use and occupy the space without interference from a holdover tenant or any other unauthorized occupant. After all, one of the primary reasons for entering into a lease is to have a physical space to live or conduct business.
  • However, as with all legal matters, nuances can exist. While the majority rule requires actual possession, there are states or jurisdictions where only legal possession is required, and the burden is placed on the new tenant to deal with holdovers.
  • But again, the majority trend leans toward requiring landlords to deliver actual possession. If you’re dealing with a specific issue or jurisdiction, it would be essential to consult local landlord-tenant statutes and case law or seek legal counsel for detailed guidance.

I know better than to trust GPT-4, which is trained on the internet rather than on legal databases, as an authoritative source on legal principles. In my previous posts, I have illustrated simply how GPT-4 could help a new lawyer identify legal issues in a client problem, understand the general scope of those issues, and generate questions to ask a client about the problem. I would not rely on GPT-4 to tell me whether a rule is the majority rule–or whether a particular state follows that rule.

So I turned to WestLaw to unravel this knotty question of whether a majority of states allow the landlord to deliver only legal possession to a tenant. WestLaw quickly confirmed that GPT-4 was correct. An ALR annotation collecting cases suggests that eleven states allow the landlord to deliver only legal possession, while twenty require the landlord to deliver actual possession together with legal possession. Two thoughtful student notes affirm that the requirement of actual possession is very much the majority rule, with one (Heiser) referring to a “mass exodus” away from the rule that legal possession suffices. (See the end of this post for citations.)

Even the state that originated the more landlord-friendly rule, New York, discarded it by statute in 1962. New York’s Real Property Law Article 7, section 233-a now provides: “In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, there shall be implied in every lease of real property a condition that the lessor will deliver possession at the beginning of the term.”

If you’ve followed me down this rabbit hole of real property law, you’ve learned: (1) At least for this rule of law, GPT-4 accurately identified the majority and minority rules. It was also able to explain those rules concisely. (2) NCBE is using, as one of the few sample questions it has released for the NextGen exam, a question that tests an outdated, minority rule. I alerted a contact at NCBE about this situation in mid-September, but the question is still on the sample questions site.

What do these lessons teach us about using AI in entry-law practice? And what do they suggest about the bar exam? I will explore both those questions in upcoming posts. Spoiler alert on the second question: It’s easy to declare, “ha, NCBE is wrong!” but the lesson I draw from this is deeper and more complex than that.

References:

Implied covenant or obligation to provide lessee with actual possession, 96 A.L.R.3d 1155 (Originally published in 1979, updated weekly).

Christopher Wm. Sullivan, Forgotten Lessons from the Common Law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, and the Holdover Tenant, 84 Wash. U.L. Rev. 1287 (2006).

Matthew J. Heiser, What’s Good for the Goose Isn’t Always Good for the Gander: The Inefficiencies of A Single Default Rule for Delivery of Possession of Leasehold Estates, 38 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 171 (2004).

gpt-4-beats-the-bar-exam

GPT-4 Beats the Bar Exam

In the first three posts in this series, I used a bar exam question as an example of the type of problem a new lawyer might confront in practice. I then explored how GPT-4 might help a new lawyer address that practice problem. In this post, I’ll work with another sample question that NCBE has released for the NextGen bar exam. On this question, GPT-4 beats the bar exam. In other words, a new lawyer using GPT-4 would obtain better answers than one who remembered material studied for the bar exam.

Take a look at the seventh multiple-choice question on the NextGen list of sample questions. In this question, the client is a state college that wants to fire a tennis coach. The question format parallels the one we discussed in my previous posts: It asks which “legal topics are the most important for you to research before advising the client” and instructs the test-taker to choose two topics from a list of six.

When prompted with the multiple-choice question, GPT-4 quickly identifies the two correct answers: employment at will and procedural due process. The Bot also offers succinct explanations about why those topics are the most important of the six to research. But that’s not the interesting part–we already know that GPT-4 can easily pass the bar exam.

Instead, I prompted GPT-4 (on a different day and with a new conversation) with the fact pattern in this MCQ and asked: “What legal topics are most important for you to research before advising the client?” Here’s how GPT-4 responded:


When representing a state college considering terminating an employee, several legal considerations come into play. Given the provided facts, here are the most important legal topics to research before advising the client:

  1. At-Will Employment vs. Contractual Employment:

In many U.S. jurisdictions, unless there is an employment contract stating otherwise, employment is typically considered “at-will.” This means that either the employer or the employee can terminate the employment relationship at any time for any reason (that isn’t illegal). However, if the coach and college had an oral contract, its terms will need to be considered.

2. Oral Contracts:

While written contracts are easier to enforce, oral contracts can still be binding. The challenge is proving their terms and existence. Research would be needed to determine the enforceability of oral contracts in your jurisdiction and what evidence would be required to prove the terms of such an agreement

3. Implied Contract:

Even if there was no formal oral agreement about the contract’s duration, the actions and communications between the college and the coach might have implied a certain term of employment. Research would be needed to determine if an implied contract was potentially formed and its implications.

4. Due Process Rights for Public Employees:

Since the college is a state institution, the coach may have constitutional due process rights. If the coach has a property interest in their job (i.e., a reasonable expectation of continued employment), the state cannot deprive them of this without due process. Depending on local laws and court rulings, this might entail the need for a hearing before termination.

5. Public Policy and Whistleblower Protections:

The coach cannot be terminated for reasons that violate public policy (e.g., reporting illegal activities). Ensure that the budget cuts are the true and only reason for the contemplated termination.

6. Discrimination Laws:

Federal and state laws prohibit employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, and sometimes sexual orientation and gender identity. Ensure the coach’s termination isn’t grounded in any discriminatory reasons.

7. Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing:

In some jurisdictions, there’s an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships. This means that even in at-will employment, employers cannot terminate employees to avoid paying earned benefits or for other bad faith reasons.

8. Potential Damages:

If the coach were to bring a wrongful termination suit and win, what would the potential damages be? This might include lost wages, emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.

9. Alternative Dispute Resolution:

Does the state college have any policies or practices regarding mediation or arbitration before proceeding with termination?

10. Release and Settlement Options:

If the college wants to avoid potential litigation, they might consider offering the coach a severance package in exchange for a release of claims.

After researching these topics, it would be crucial to provide a well-informed opinion to the client about the potential risks and benefits of terminating the coach, as well as any alternative strategies that might minimize legal exposure.


This answer includes the two points tested by the MCQ, but it is much more comprehensive. A new lawyer would do well following the leads offered by GPT-4. In contrast, a lawyer who simply remembered material tested on the bar exam would fall woefully short of serving this client competently. Comparing these two responses points out three problems with the bar exam–and with legal education more generally.

First, the subjects tested by the bar exam–and that we teach as “foundational” in law school–do not track contemporary law practice. The discrimination laws cited by GPT-4 are as (or more) critical to an employment law practice as the notion of employment at will. One of the first questions I would ask my client in this situation is whether the coach is a member of any protected class. But discrimination laws are not part of the subject matter tested on the bar exam, so the question doesn’t embrace them.

Second, both law school and the bar exam teach aspiring lawyers to think narrowly. Courses, classroom hours, and exam questions (especially multiple-choice ones) march students through hundreds of isolated doctrinal rules. Except in clinics, we rarely ask students to solve whole legal problems. GPT-4 is absolutely right that the terms of the oral contract, the possibility of an implied contract, and the extent of damages are as important for the lawyer to consider as the concept of employment at will. Yet we rarely encourage students to consider multiple doctrines within a single subject area, much less across subjects.

Students may need to learn some legal principles in isolation but I think we, as legal educators, need to recognize how atomized our teaching and testing have become. Over the last few decades, we have squeezed ever more doctrine into each credit hour, losing opportunities to help students integrate those pieces. Our shift towards multiple-choice testing, meanwhile, reinforces the notion that law consists of discrete legal principles operating in isolation.

Third, our teaching and licensing focus too much on reciting legal rights–and too little on helping clients solve problems more holistically. Even when a client asks only about the “legal repercussions” of an action, as the client did in this bar exam question, an effective lawyer would explore the problem more holistically with the client. Is abrupt termination the only solution to the client’s problem? Could the client offer the coach a severance package that would avoid litigation? Even if the client has no legal obligation to offer the coach a hearing, would a hearing help ease the blow to the coach? Could a hearing even lead to a new solution to the client’s underlying problem (a budget shortfall)? Maybe the coach would be willing to cut back their hours and continue serving the team.

Even without special prompting, GPT-4 recognized one of these more holistic solutions (a severance package) as an issue for the new attorney to consider. The bar exam question, in contrast, forces the aspiring lawyer to focus single-mindedly on the “legal topics.” Who is the machine in this comparison? Could working with GPT-4, ironically, lead us back to more holistic problem-solving with our clients?

Statement of Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Director of the AO, Regarding Veto of the JUDGES Act

Published on December 24, 2024

Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr., the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, issued the following statement regarding the President’s veto of S. 4199, the Judicial Understaffing Delays Getting Emergencies Solved (JUDGES) Act:

“The President’s veto of the JUDGES Act is extremely disappointing. Providing additional judgeships is essential to improving access to the courts and necessary for the efficient and effective administration of justice, as the Judiciary stated in a recent letter to the President (PDF) addressing issues raised by the Administration in objection to the bill. The judgeship legislation presented to the President reflects decades of work by the federal Judiciary and is very similar to legislation introduced in the last Congress. It is not a bill that was hastily put together. Rather it is the product of careful and detailed analysis which considers primarily the weighted caseload per active judge in each judicial district, while also factoring in the contribution of senior judges, magistrate judges and visiting judges. 

“This veto is a deviation from the long historical pattern of approving judgeship bills that awarded new judgeships to sitting Presidents. The President’s veto is contrary to the actions of Senator Biden who helped pass many of those bills. 

“It is regrettable that the Administration failed to support the federal Judiciary, and rejected this bipartisan, bicameral and interbranch agreement (PDF). The President’s veto will contribute to the pattern of growing caseloads and increasing backlogs that hurt litigants and weakens public confidence in our courts. We appreciate the support of Congress and look forward to working with them to enact essential judgeship legislation.”

New Courthouse Learning Center Teaches Minnesota Students About Judiciary

At the new learning center, students and adults alike can learn about the important role the Judiciary plays in daily life. Educational materials at the facilities include information and activities about the Constitution, landmark Supreme Court cases, federal court basics, jury service, and careers in the U.S. justice system. The center is staffed by employees of the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.

“For many years, our judges have reached out to students and the community, but we have not had a place for visitors to learn about democracy and the rule of law,” said U.S. District Judge John R. Tunheim, who spearheaded the multi-year effort. “The Center provides a unique interactive experience and at the same time, the chance to observe a court session and talk with a judge.” 

The project was brought to life in partnership with the Minnesota Chapter of the Federal Bar Association and the Foundation of the Federal Bar Association, along with countless federal court staff and community members. 

The court hopes to attract 5,000 visitors per year to the learning center, which is located in the Warren E. Burger Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse. Planning is underway for an additional learning center in Minneapolis. 

Students See Their Future in the Judiciary as They Celebrate Bill of Rights Day

Several courtroom deputies, U.S. marshals, and court security officers also talked about their career paths, including one whose first exposure to the courts was participating in a courtroom program when he was in high school. 

“I learned that you can always change how you see your future,” said Souran Moore, a high school student who attended the program. “The judge and the other professionals gave us very important encouragement.” 

Student feedback documented that interacting with judges and court staff breaks through negative stereotypes and helps students see the difference between reality and media portrayals. 

“It was different because Judge Judy is not like this,” said high school student Isaiah Ali. “The judge I met today was way better.”  

Twenty-five schools across the nation already are participating in the Bill of Rights program in December and beyond. The court teams are planning visits virtually and in-person to help students gain a real-world understanding of the Bill of Rights and the types of careers available in the justice system. 

“We found that when we circulated the program information through the North Dakota Department of Public Instruction, many teachers expressed interest,” said U.S. Magistrate Judge Alice R. Senechal, of the District of North Dakota. “They immediately saw the potential to open up students’ horizons to careers in the courts and learn how the Bill of Rights impacts their lives.”  

Teachers interested in classroom or courtroom visits may send their requests to Rebecca Fanning, the national educational outreach manager at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and she will help coordinate a visit virtually or in-person. Visits may be scheduled starting in December and until the end of the school year. 

Visit the educational resources section for additional programs and activities. 

Judge Joel M. Flaum Receives 2024 Devitt Award

Judge Joel M. Flaum, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, is the 2024 recipient of the Edward J. Devitt Distinguished Service to Justice Award. Flaum received the award in a Nov. 13 ceremony presided over by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., at the U.S. Supreme Court.

For 40 years, the Devitt Award has honored an Article III judge who has had a distinguished career and made significant contributions to the administration of justice, the advancement of the rule of law, and the improvement of society as a whole.

Recipients are chosen by a committee of federal judges. This year, the committee was chaired by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett, and included Judge John Z. Lee, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and U.S. District Judge Dabney L. Friedrich, of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

“Judge Flaum has given more than half of his life to the judiciary,” Justice Barrett said. “He has served the justice system with a grace and collegiality that has earned him the unanimous respect and admiration of his colleagues, and he is altogether deserving of the highest honor bestowed upon an Article III federal judge.”

“I am most grateful to be included among the outstanding judges who have previously received the Devitt Award, named after the distinguished jurist Edward J. Devitt and established by the Opperman Foundation,” Judge Flaum said. “I wish to thank the selection committee, my colleagues, and members of the bar for this honor.”

Flaum was appointed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 1974. He was elevated to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1983 and served as chief judge from 2000 to 2006.

Flaum was born in Hudson, New York. He graduated from Union College in 1958 and Northwestern University School of Law in 1963. He went on to earn a Master of Laws degree from Northwestern in 1964. Flaum served as a U.S. Naval Reserve lieutenant commander in the JAG Corps, from 1981 to 1992. 

Flaum began his legal career at a Chicago law firm before entering a career in public service as an assistant state’s attorney for Cook County, Illinois, in 1965. He later became First Assistant Illinois Attorney General and was First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois when he joined the federal bench.

According to a news release by the Dwight D. Opperman Foundation, which sponsors the Devitt Award, Flaum was nominated for the honor by all of his judicial colleagues in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

“Judge Flaum’s straightforward legal reasoning and writing, grounded in statutory text, always commands respect,” wrote the judges in their nomination submission. “He has made extraordinary contributions across multiple fields, each of which has strengthened the federal judiciary immeasurably.”

The Devitt Award is named for the late Edward J. Devitt, longtime chief judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.